

Chapter 7

True, Authentic, Faithful: Accuracy in Memory for Dreams

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Abstract What is it to remember a dream accurately? This paper argues that neither of the two available concepts of mnemonic accuracy, namely, truth and authenticity, enables us to answer this question and that a new understanding of accuracy is therefore needed: a dream memory is accurate not when it is true or authentic but rather when it is “faithful” to the remembered dream. In addition to memory for dreams, the paper applies the notion of faithfulness to memory for perceptual experiences, memory for imaginations, and memory for hallucinations and briefly considers the broader implications of adopting an understanding of mnemonic accuracy as faithfulness.

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7.1 Introduction: Accuracy in Memory for Dreams

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The question of the nature of accuracy in memory for dreams appears to have been asked previously neither in the philosophical literature on dreaming nor in that on memory. This paper develops and defends an answer to the question, an answer that will turn out to have consequences for our understanding of the accuracy of memory in general.

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Before the question can be stated precisely, some background assumptions and some terminology are required. To begin with, two assumptions. First, we sometimes dream about particular events. Second, we sometimes—including when we dream about particular events—remember what we dream. Both of these assumptions are intuitively plausible, but both might be challenged.

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As far as the first assumption is concerned, Debus (2014) argues that, because they lack the kind of causal connection that is privileged by the causal theory of memory (Martin & Deutscher, 1966), episodic future thoughts, unlike episodic

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28 memories, are never about particular events but only about event types (see
 29 Sant’Anna, 2022), and one might argue that, for the same reason, dreams are never
 30 about particular events but only about event types. In reply to Debus, Michaelian
 31 (2016a) argues that advocates both of the causal theory and of the rival (post-causal)
 32 simulation theory (Michaelian, 2016b) should grant that both episodic memories
 33 and episodic future thoughts are sometimes about event types but sometimes about
 34 particular events. This is not the place to review Michaelian’s reasoning; let us sim-
 35 ply suppose that his argument succeeds. If it does, a similar line of reasoning is
 36 likely applicable to dreaming, in which case dreams are sometimes about event
 37 types but sometimes about particular events. The focus here will be on dreams about
 38 particular events.

39 As far as the second assumption is concerned, Dennett (1976) suggests that,
 40 strictly speaking, we do not remember what we dream; instead, an unconscious
 41 composition process during sleep prepares “cassettes” that are unconsciously
 42 inserted into memory upon waking. Whether the intuitively plausible view that we
 43 sometimes remember what we dream or, instead, a view along the lines of the alter-
 44 native suggested by Dennett is right is ultimately an empirical question, one about
 45 which there is room for disagreement (Windt, 2020). Rosen (2013), for instance,
 46 voices scepticism with respect to our ability to remember our dreams, while Windt
 47 (2013) is more optimistic. No attempt will be made here to adjudicate this debate;
 48 Windt’s optimistic view will simply be taken for granted. If that view is right, we
 49 sometimes remember what we dream, including, presumably, when we dream about
 50 particular events.

51 Next, some terminology. Let “episodic memories” be memories of events,¹ “epi-
 52 sodic dreams” be dreams of events, and “episodic dream memories” be episodic
 53 memories of episodic dreams—that is, episodic memories that correspond to epi-
 54 sodic dreams in the way in which other episodic memories correspond to perceptual
 55 experiences. (While this terminology will be helpful in setting things up, it will, for
 56 the sake of ease of expression, often be useful to refer simply to “dreams”, “memo-
 57 ries”, and “dream memories”.) The focus of the paper is on episodic dream memo-
 58 ries. Thus we will not be concerned with semantic memories of episodic dreams,
 59 memories that one would characteristically report by saying “I remember that I
 60 dreamt of *e*”, where *e* is an event. Nor will we be concerned with episodic memories
 61 of non-episodic dreams, memories that one would characteristically report by say-
 62 ing, for example, “I remember dreaming that *P*”, where *P* is a proposition. We will
 63 be concerned exclusively with episodic memories of episodic dreams—episodic
 64 dream memories.

65 One might report these memories in either of two ways. First, one might say “I
 66 remember dreaming of *e*”. Second, one might simply say “I remember *e*”, where *e*

¹ On most accounts, episodic memory involves more—such as the phenomenology usually referred to as “autonoesis”—than mere event memory (see Perrin & Rousset, 2014). The definition of episodic memory as event memory may thus be an oversimplification, but this should make no difference to what follows.

is an event about which one takes oneself to have dreamt.² The first kind of report is more common, but it is the second kind of report that more clearly points to the sort of remembering on which the paper will focus: the sort of remembering of interest here is not remembering a dream *as a dream* but rather remembering *what one dreamt*—the event about which one dreamt. When all goes well, metacognitive monitoring of the retrieval process ensures that one is aware, as one remembers an event about which one dreamt, that one is remembering a dream (see Horton et al., 2007). But something analogous is true when one remembers an event that one perceived, and this does not imply that one remembers one’s perceiving of the event rather than the event that one perceived. By the same token, one can remember an event that one dreamt, rather than one’s dreaming of the event: in an episodic dream memory, one does not remember oneself dreaming, any more than, in a perception memory (an episodic memory of a perceptual experience), one remembers oneself perceiving—one remembers what one dreamt, just as one remembers what one perceived.³

Finally, some additional background assumptions. First, episodic dreams and episodic memories, including episodic dream memories, are (or at least involve) representations. Some have denied that memories are representations.⁴ And some would presumably be prepared to deny that dreams are (or involve) representations. It will be left to defenders of such views of memory and dreaming to determine whether and how the question of the accuracy of dream memories can be stated within their favoured frameworks and whether the answer to that question that is defended here is compatible with those frameworks. Second—this may, depending on how the notion of representation is understood, follow from the first assumption—episodic dream and episodic (dream) memory representations can be accurate or inaccurate.⁵ Finally, episodic dream representations and episodic (dream) memory representations are representations of the same kind: sensory representations of events (see, e.g., McGinn, 2004; Ichikawa, 2009).

With this background in place, our question can be stated more precisely: *what is it for an episodic dream memory to be accurate?* Before turning to the motivation for this question, it will be helpful to distinguish it from another to which it is related. Let us get some examples on the table. Suppose that I dream of winning the Nobel Prize for philosophy; later, I might remember what I dreamt. Suppose that I dream of buying a car that is both red and green all over; later, I might remember

²On the (potential) contrast between reports of these two forms for perceiving rather than dreaming, see Vendler (1979) and D’Ambrosio and Stoljar (2021).

³There is a background assumption here to the effect that the retrieved memory itself is neutral with respect to whether the remembered event actually occurred. For a defence of this assumption, see Michaelian (2012). Interestingly, Dranseika’s (2020) results suggest that laypeople are willing to say that a subject remembers a dreamt event even when the subject misidentifies that event as one that actually occurred.

⁴Reid is sometimes read this way, though see Copenhaver (2017).

⁵It is not entirely obvious that dreams, in particular, can be *inaccurate* with respect to their objects; this issue is discussed below.

101 what I dreamt. We might ask, in each of these cases, in virtue of what it is that I
 102 remember what I dreamt. This is, essentially, a question about *reference* in dream
 103 memory. Werning and Liefke ([this volume](#)) tackle this question, taking the reference
 104 of the dream for granted and attempting to explain how the reference of the dream
 105 is inherited by the memory. This paper will take both the reference of the dream and
 106 the inheritance of the reference of the dream by the memory for granted. In other
 107 words, the focus here is neither on how the dream gets to be about what it is about
 108 nor on how the memory gets to be about what the dream was about. The focus is,
 109 instead, on what it is for a dream memory to be accurate, given that the dream was
 110 about something and that the memory is about what the dream was about.⁶

111 The motivation for asking what it is for an *episodic dream memory* to be *accu-*
 112 *rate* derives from a more general question at the heart of current debate in the phi-
 113 losophy of memory: what is it for an *episodic memory* to be *successful*? Recent
 114 discussions of the conditions that must be met by a memory, in order for it to count
 115 as successful (see Michaelian, [2022](#) for an overview), have taken the accuracy of the
 116 experience to which the memory corresponds for granted; they have, that is, focussed
 117 entirely on memory for veridical experiences. But not all of our experiences are
 118 veridical, and an adequate account of successful remembering will apply to memo-
 119 ries for nonveridical as well as veridical experiences (Baysan, [2018](#)). Most dreams
 120 (though arguably not all—see below) are nonveridical, and the thought that moti-
 121 vates this paper is that looking at the conditions that must be met by dream memo-
 122 ries, in order for them to count as successful, will provide insight into the conditions
 123 that must be met by memories for nonveridical experiences in general.

124 Now, the debate over the nature of successful remembering presupposes that a
 125 memory must, in order for it to count as successful, satisfy both an accuracy condi-
 126 tion and an additional condition designed to rule out merely coincidental accuracy.
 127 While this general approach goes back to Martin and Deutscher ([1966](#)), participants
 128 in the current debate focus, in contrast to Martin and Deutscher, not on hypothetical
 129 cases but rather on clinical memory errors, such as confabulation. In order to rule
 130 out veridical confabulation and other sorts of coincidentally accurate apparent
 131 memory, participants in the debate have invoked both a variety of causal conditions
 132 inspired by the causal theory of memory and a reliability condition drawn from the
 133 simulation theory of memory. In principle, an account of successful memory for
 134 dreams might be produced simply by applying the accuracy condition and the addi-
 135 tional condition posited by one's preferred causalist or simulationist framework to

⁶Werning and Liefke suggest that, because simulationism, unlike causalism, does not require a causal link between the retrieved memory and the corresponding dream experience, it is unclear how the simulationist might explain the inheritance of the reference of the dream by the memory. If reference poses a problem for simulationism, however, the problem that it poses is not specific to memory for dreams but will arise regardless of the nature of the corresponding earlier experience. This problem is beyond the scope of the present paper (but see Openshaw & Michaelian, [2024](#)). Note, however, that the metaphor of inheritance may be ill-suited to simulationism, which does not require that a remembered event have been previously experienced (i.e., that there be a corresponding earlier experience). Since, in the case of memory for dreams, there is no possibility of remembering a non-experienced event, the metaphor is unobjectionable in the present context.

the case of dream memory. In practice, the debate has concentrated almost entirely on the causal and reliability conditions, with little being said about the accuracy condition, presumably because there is no apparent reason for causalists and simulationists to disagree about the nature of accuracy. It is, however, unclear how the accuracy of dream memories is to be understood, and thus, while we have a fairly good idea of what the causal or reliability component of an account of successful dream memory might look like, we know less about the options with respect to the accuracy component. The focus here will thus be on accuracy.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 7.2 reviews a standard distinction between two forms of accuracy in remembering, namely, truth and authenticity. Section 7.3 argues that accuracy in dream memory does not amount to truth. Section 7.4 argues that accuracy in dream memory does not amount to authenticity. Section 7.5 introduces a new notion of mnemonic accuracy, faithfulness, and applies it to memory for perceiving, memory for imagining, and memory for hallucinating, in addition to memory for dreaming. Section 7.6 brings the paper to a close with a discussion of the implications of adopting an understanding of mnemonic accuracy as faithfulness for causalism and simulationism.

7.2 Two Kinds of Accuracy: Truth and Authenticity

Let us refer to the event that a dream represents as “the dreamt event” and to the event of dreaming as “the dreaming event”. The two obvious ways of understanding accuracy in memory for dreams is as accuracy with respect to the dreamt event and accuracy with respect to the dreaming event. As noted above, one does not, in an episodic dream memory, remember oneself dreaming—one does not, that is, entertain a representation of oneself dreaming (for example, asleep in bed).⁷ Accuracy with respect to the dreaming event must, then, be a matter of accuracy with respect to the *experience* of dreaming—it must, that is, be a matter of entertaining the same representation again or of entertaining a similar representation.⁸ These two kinds of accuracy thus boil down to *truth* and *authenticity* (Bernecker, 2010). As the terms are standardly defined, a memory is true just in case it is accurate with respect to the originally experienced event (that is, it accurately represents that event)⁹ and is

⁷Causalists will maintain that a memory that represents the rememberer dreaming is necessarily unsuccessful, simply because one cannot experience oneself dreaming. Unlike the causal theory, the simulation theory does not include a condition requiring that the subject previously experienced a remembered event. Simulationists will thus grant that it is possible, in principle, for an apparent memory that represents the rememberer dreaming to be successful. Even simulationists will, however, take such cases to be highly unusual, and they will not be considered here.

⁸Such accuracy presupposes identity or similarity of content but not of vehicle.

⁹On an alternative definition of truth, a memory is true just in case it is accurate not with respect to the originally experienced event but rather with respect to the event that unfolded before the subject’s eyes at the time of the original experience. The two definitions can come apart; see Sect. 7.3.

166 authentic just in case it is accurate with respect to the subject’s original experience
 167 of the event (that is, it includes no content that was not included in the subject’s
 168 original representation of the event). To say that a dream memory is accurate with
 169 respect to the dreamt event amounts to saying that it is true, whereas to say that a
 170 dream memory is accurate with respect to the dreaming event amounts to saying
 171 that it is authentic.¹⁰

172 Bernecker, who first explicitly introduced the distinction between truth and
 173 authenticity, himself holds that both forms of accuracy are required for successful
 174 memory. Let us refer to this view as “authenticism”. It might be suggested that that
 175 label ought to be reserved for the view that memory requires authenticity but not
 176 truth, but that view does not seem to have been defended in the literature; what we
 177 are calling “authenticism”, in contrast, is fairly widely endorsed (see, e.g.,
 178 McCarroll, 2018). In opposition to authenticism, Michaelian (2016b, 2022) has
 179 argued that memory requires truth but not authenticity. Let us refer to this view as
 180 “alethism”. We will see, in the next section of the paper, that accuracy in dream
 181 memory cannot be a matter of truth. This suffices to rule out both alethism and
 182 authenticism. Authenticism—along with the view that successful memory requires
 183 authenticity but not truth—is also ruled out by the following section, which shows
 184 that accuracy in dream memory cannot be a matter of authenticity.

185 7.3 The Problem with Truth

186 It will be helpful, in considering the view that accuracy in dream memory is a matter
 187 of truth, to have a comparison case in hand.¹¹ Just as one can remember what one
 188 dreamt, one can remember what one imagined or what one hallucinated, and dream-
 189 ing itself is often compared to imagining and hallucinating. Dreams, imaginations,
 190 and hallucinations are alike in two salient respects. First, they typically do not rep-
 191 resent occurrent events (events that have occurred, are now occurring, or will
 192 occur).¹² Second, although they typically do not represent occurrent events, they
 193 may sometimes represent such events. To see this, note that we sometimes dream

¹⁰One might object to the distinction between truth and accuracy on the ground that, in order for it to make sense to think of authenticity, as defined by Bernecker, as a kind of accuracy, one must take the memory to represent—to be about—the experience, in which case it would not make sense to treat a given memory as being authentic but untrue. The objection would certainly be worth pursuing, but this is not the place to do so—the distinction between truth and authenticity is standard and will simply be taken for granted here.

¹¹The discussion in this section presupposes the correspondence conception of truth, as is standard in discussions of mnemonic accuracy. While it would be worthwhile to consider how the discussion might differ were a different (e.g., deflationary) conception of truth to be adopted, doing so here would lead us too far afield.

¹²The assumption that hallucinations and other perceptual experiences can be of events seems safe, but a fuller discussion would need to take perception of other kinds of entities, such as objects, as well as the corresponding memories (Openshaw, 2022), into account.

about events that did occur. Suppose that I dream about working on a paper on memory for dreams. Suppose that I did in fact work on a paper on memory for dreams. If the right conditions are met—again, no attempt will be made here to explain the reference of dreams—the dream will be about the event in question and, indeed, may represent it accurately. Something similar is arguably true of imagination (Munro, 2021) and even of hallucination (James, 2014). Although dreaming, imagining, and hallucinating may sometimes amount to representations of occurrent events and even to veridical representations of occurrent events, cases in which they do so are unusual, and veridical dreaming, imagining, and hallucinating can be set aside for now.

In order to narrow things down further, nonveridical imagining will also be set aside. This leaves us with dreaming about nonoccurrent events and, as a comparison case, nonveridical hallucinating.¹³ The first of the examples given above (in which I dream of winning the Nobel Prize for philosophy) serves to illustrate the kind of dreaming in question, as does the second (in which I dream of buying a car that is both red and green all over), the difference between them being that, while the first example involves a counterfactual but possible event (there is no Nobel Prize for philosophy in the actual world, but there is such a prize in certain other possible worlds, and in some of those worlds—however distant they may be—I win it), the second example involves a counterpossible event (there is no possible world in which I own a car that is both red and green all over). Analogous cases of hallucinating are easy to generate.

The comparison between dreaming and hallucinating will enable us to see that the view that accuracy in memory for dreams is a matter of truth is problematic for two reasons. First, because, in the case of dream memory, there is no “originally experienced event” with respect to which the accuracy of the dream memory might be assessed.¹⁴ Dream memory is like hallucination memory in this respect. Second, because there is no “other” relevant event with respect to which the accuracy of the dream memory might be assessed. Dream memory is unlike hallucination memory in this respect. In short, in contrast to hallucination memories, which are *truth-apt*, even if they are invariably false, dream memories are not truth-apt.

It will take some work to establish these points. Suppose, to begin with, that one hallucinates. Suppose that one remembers one’s hallucination. We want, intuitively, to say that there are two possibilities with respect to the accuracy of one’s hallucination memory. On the one hand, the memory might be authentic. If it is authentic, then it will be untrue, simply because the hallucination did not correspond to the

¹³Dreaming about occurrent events and veridical hallucinating, along with veridical and nonveridical imagining, are discussed in Sect. 7.5.

¹⁴One might object here that there is in fact an originally experienced event, namely, the event that the dream was about. Just as hallucinations can both be experiences and be about events without amounting to experiences of the events that they are about (see below), however, the fact that one experiences when dreaming about an event does not imply that one experiences that event. (I might dream at night about the events of the next day, but, when I wake up in the morning, I have not yet experienced them.)

230 event that unfolded before one's eyes at the time of the experience, so that, if the
231 memory is accurate with respect to the hallucination, then it is inaccurate with
232 respect to the event. On the other hand, the memory might be true. If it is true, then
233 it will be inauthentic, again simply because the hallucination did not correspond to
234 the event that unfolded before one's eyes at the time of the experience, so that, if the
235 memory is accurate with respect to the event, then it is inaccurate with respect to the
236 hallucination.

237 Given the way truth has been defined, however, we cannot say this. The defini-
238 tion given above says that a memory is true just in case it is accurate with respect to
239 the originally experienced event. This is equivalent to saying that a memory is
240 untrue just in case it is inaccurate with respect to the originally experienced event.
241 The problem is that, in the case of hallucination, *there is* no originally experienced
242 event. In hallucinating, the subject *experiences*, but he does not experience *an event*.
243 Thus, if we employ the definition of truth given above, we will have to say that hal-
244 lucination memories are never true or untrue. The categories "true" and "untrue" are
245 simply inapplicable—hallucination memories are not truth-apt. The same thing
246 holds with respect to dream memories. In dreaming, the subject experiences, but he
247 does not experience an event. Thus, if we employ the definition of truth given above,
248 we will have to say that dream memories are never true or untrue—they are not
249 truth-apt. It is not immediately clear whether we should treat dream memories as
250 being capable of being (un)true, but we do want to treat hallucination memories as
251 being capable of being (un)true. The problem thus suggests that the definition of
252 truth in memory needs to be modified.

253 Intuitively speaking, what makes a hallucination memory true is that it corre-
254 sponds to the event that the subject "should have" experienced but did not—the
255 event that unfolded before the subject's eyes at the time of the hallucinatory experi-
256 ence. This suggests a modified definition of truth: a memory is true just in case it is
257 accurate with respect to the event that unfolded before the subject's eyes at the time
258 of the original experience. Equivalently: a memory is untrue just in case it is inac-
259 curate with respect to the event that unfolded before the subject's eyes at the time of
260 the original experience. The difference between the modified definition and the
261 original definition is that the modified definition mentions the original experience
262 only incidentally; it is not the experience but the time at which it occurred that fixes
263 the event with respect to which accuracy is to be assessed. A similar line of reason-
264 ing leads to the conclusion that the original definition of authenticity—which says
265 that a memory is authentic just in case it is accurate with respect to the subject's
266 original experience of the event—ought to be replaced with a modified definition of
267 authenticity on which a memory is authentic just in case it is accurate with respect
268 to the subject's original experience *tout court*. The difference between the modified
269 definition of authenticity and the original definition is simply that the modified defi-
270 nition does not presuppose that the original experience was an experience of an
271 event. If these modified definitions are adopted, then we are able to say what we
272 want to say about hallucination memories: hallucination memories are truth-apt; in
273 particular, they are untrue if authentic and inauthentic if true.

While the modified definition of authenticity appears to be unproblematic, the modified definition of truth leads to unacceptable consequences when applied to dream memories, for we do not want to say that a dream memory is true if it is accurate with respect to the event that unfolded before the subject's eyes at the time of the dream experience. Suppose that I dreamt of having lunch in my favourite restaurant. Suppose that I remember (dreaming of) sitting in a boring meeting. Suppose that, as I dreamt of having lunch in my favourite restaurant, I was in fact sitting (asleep) in a boring meeting.¹⁵ We clearly do not want to say that my memory is true in this case. It is, of course, accurate with respect to the event that unfolded before my eyes at the time of the relevant experience, but that event is, intuitively speaking, irrelevant. The comparison of dream memories to hallucination memories enables us to see why. Suppose that I hallucinated having lunch in my favourite restaurant. Suppose that I remember sitting in a boring meeting. Suppose that, as I hallucinated having lunch in my favourite restaurant, I was in fact sitting in a boring meeting. We do want to say that my memory is true (though only coincidentally so) in this case, for it is accurate with respect to the event that unfolded before my eyes at the time of the relevant experience, and that event is the one that I would have experienced, had I not been hallucinating. Since hallucination amounts, in cases of the kind at issue here, to a malfunction or breakdown in cognition, that event is the one that I *should have* experienced. Dreaming, in contrast, does not amount to a malfunction in cognition, so the event that I would have experienced, had I not been dreaming, is *not* the event that I should have experienced; *there is* no event that I should have experienced.

The consequence is that the definition needs to be modified further, so that it says that a memory is true just in case, first, if the subject experienced an event, the memory is accurate with respect to the event that he experienced, and, second, if the subject did not but should have experienced an event, the memory is accurate with respect to the event that he should have experienced—the event to which we might refer to as the “normative” event.¹⁶ Equivalently: a memory is untrue just in case, first, if the subject experienced an event, the memory is inaccurate with respect to the event that he experienced, and, second, if the subject did not but should have experienced an event, the memory is inaccurate with respect to the normative event. This definition still has the consequence that hallucination memories are truth-apt, but, like the previous definitions, it has the consequence that dream memories are not truth-apt. That consequence now appears clearly to be desirable. In both hallucination memory and dream memory, there is no originally experienced event with

¹⁵It might be objected here that, in the case of dreaming, unlike in the case of hallucinating, the relevant event is not necessarily the one that unfolded before the subject's eyes at the time of the experience but rather the event about which one dreamt, which may occur at another point in time. This is right but overlooks the fact that we are, at this stage in the argument, concerned only with memory for dreams of nonoccurrent events. Memory of dreams for occurrent events (regardless of the time at which they occur) is discussed in Sect. 7.5.

¹⁶The notion of a normative event requires further development. In particular, factors such as what the subject was attending to will need to be taken into account.

310 respect to which the accuracy of the memory might be assessed. In hallucination
 311 memory, however, there is “another” event with respect to which the accuracy of the
 312 memory can be assessed: the event that the subject should have experienced. In
 313 dream memory, in contrast, there is no such “other” event.¹⁷ We can thus conclude
 314 that accuracy in dream memory does not require truth.

315 7.4 The Problem with Authenticity

316 Though dream memories are not truth-apt, they are *authenticity-apt*. A memory is,
 317 again, authentic just in case it is accurate with respect to the subject’s original expe-
 318 rience—that is, just in case it includes no content that was not included in that
 319 experience. A dream memory, in particular, will be authentic just in case it is accu-
 320 rate with respect to the experience of dreaming—that is, just in case it includes no
 321 content that was not included in the dream. There is nothing to prevent dream mem-
 322 ories from (sometimes) being authentic.¹⁸ And a view on which accuracy in memory
 323 for dreams amounts to authenticity has some intuitive appeal: given that a dreamt
 324 event is not an occurrent event with respect to which a dream memory might be
 325 assessed for truth, it would seem that what matters, as far as the accuracy of dream
 326 memory is concerned, must be the dream itself—the dreaming event, rather than the
 327 dream event.

328 Despite its intuitive appeal, this view, like the view that accuracy in dream mem-
 329 ory amounts to truth, faces a serious problem. Stated in general terms, the problem
 330 is that one can remember a dream accurately even when, in remembering, one rep-
 331 represents the dreamt event in a way other than that in which one represented it in
 332 dreaming, in which case one’s dream memory will include content that was not
 333 included in one’s dream. There may be other examples, but the clearest example of
 334 this phenomenon is provided by cases of divergence between the *perspective*

¹⁷The consequences of the definition for imagination memory are less clear. In most cases, imagi-
 nation does not amount to malfunction; thus, in most cases, there is no event that the subject should
 have experienced, and the definition implies that imagination memory is not truth-apt. In some
 cases, imagination may amount to malfunction; in those cases, the definition implies that imagina-
 tion memory is truth-apt. There is a further complication: imagining, unlike dreaming and halluci-
 nating (at least of the idealized sorts that are at issue here), is compatible with perceptual
 experiencing: one can simultaneously imagine an event and experience the event that is unfolding
 before one’s eyes. This complication would need to be taken into account in a fuller discussion, but
 it will be bracketed here.

¹⁸No stand will be taken here on how frequently authentic dream memory might occur, but, given
 the conclusion to which this section comes (that accuracy in dream memory is not a matter of
 authenticity), it is worth noting that, given the reconstructive character of remembering, it is
 unlikely that it occurs very often; indeed, the reconstructive character of remembering suggests
 that it is unlikely that authentic memory occurs very often, even if only perception memory is
 at issue.

adopted in the dream and that adopted in the memory, and it is on this example that the remainder of this section will focus.

In order to make sense of the example, some background on perspective in memory will be required. It is standard to contrast *field perspective* memory and *observer perspective* memory. McCarroll’s definitions of these terms echo others given in the empirical and philosophical literature: “When remembering events from one’s life one often sees the remembered scene as one originally experienced it, from one’s original point of view—a field perspective. Sometimes, however, one sees oneself in the memory, as if one were an observer of the remembered scene—an observer perspective” (2018: 3). It might seem, at first glance, that observer perspective memories are bound to be inaccurate, since what one sees when remembering does not correspond to what one saw when experiencing. It is important to note, however, that truth and authenticity may come apart in observer perspective remembering. On the one hand, the fact that one sees oneself when remembering does appear to imply that one’s memory is inauthentic, simply because what one thus sees cannot be accurate with respect to one’s experience of the event. On the other hand, the fact that one sees oneself when remembering does not imply that one’s memory is untrue, for what one thus sees may still be accurate with respect to the event that one experienced.

The view that observer perspective memories can be true but cannot be authentic is defended by Bernecker (2015). McCarroll (2018), in contrast, argues for the surprising view that observer perspective memories can be both true and authentic and hence fully successful. His argument turns on two key claims. The first is that, in addition to field perspective experiences, we sometimes have observer perspective experiences, where an observer perspective experience is one that includes a nonvisual representation of the self. The second is that remembering sometimes involves a process of “translation” in which this nonvisual representation is transformed—without the addition of new content—into a visual representation of the self. If these two claims are granted, McCarroll’s view—that observer perspective memories can be both true and authentic—appears to follow. In response to McCarroll et al. (2022) have argued that, while the observer perspective experience claim is unproblematic, the translation claim is false: there is simply no way of getting from the nonvisual representations of the self that might be involved in observer perspective experiences to the visual representations of the self that are involved in observer perspective memories without the addition of content. If this is right, then observer perspective memories are indeed bound to be inauthentic. Now, Michaelian and Sant’Anna agree with McCarroll about the possibility of fully successful observer perspective remembering. Because they disagree with him about the possibility of authentic observer perspective remembering, they come to the conclusion that successful remembering (whether observer perspective or field perspective) does not require authenticity but only truth: memory, as they put it, *aims at* truth but not authenticity.

Let us suppose that Michaelian and Sant’Anna’s argument for the conclusion that observer perspective remembering cannot be authentic succeeds. If the argument of Sect. 7.3 above likewise succeeds, then we have reason to resist their further

380 conclusion that memory aims at truth: given that argument, successful dream
 381 remembering, in particular, does not require truth, which undermines the view that
 382 successful remembering, in general, requires truth. We thus come to the overall
 383 conclusion that successful remembering requires neither authenticity (because suc-
 384 cessful observer perspective memories are not authentic) nor truth (because suc-
 385 cessful dream memories are not true).¹⁹

386 It might be suggested that, even if successful remembering, in general, does not
 387 require authenticity, successful dream remembering, in particular, does require
 388 authenticity. It is at this point in the dialectic that we encounter the basic problem
 389 for the view that accuracy in dream memory amounts to authenticity: the possibility
 390 of divergence between the perspective adopted in a memory and that adopted in the
 391 corresponding dream implies that this suggestion is not right. It seems safe to
 392 assume that dreams often have a perspectival character: in dreaming, one experi-
 393 ences the dreamt event from a particular perspective.²⁰ In most cases, that perspec-
 394 tive is presumably a field perspective, the perspective of one's dream self. In other
 395 cases, it may be an observer perspective, the perspective of a hypothetical observer
 396 of the dreamt event.²¹ It seems safe to assume, moreover, that, just as one can have
 397 a field perspective perceptual experience and later have an observer perspective
 398 memory of the perceived event, one can have a field perspective dream and later
 399 have an observer perspective memory of the dreamt event—or vice versa. If
 400 Michaelian and Sant'Anna's argument against McCarroll succeeds, observer per-
 401 spective memories of field perspective perceptual experiences cannot be authentic;
 402 presumably, the same thing goes for observer perspective memories of field per-
 403 spective dreams and for field perspective memories of observer perspective dreams.²²
 404 Nevertheless, we want to be able to count cases in which the perspective adopted in
 405 the memory diverges from that adopted in the dream as instances of successful
 406 remembering. Suppose that I dream of giving the acceptance speech for the Nobel
 407 Prize for philosophy, that the dream unfolds from a field perspective, that I later

¹⁹If successful remembering requires neither truth nor authenticity, the obvious question is what kind of accuracy, if any, it *does* require. This is the question that will occupy us in Sect. 7.5.

²⁰There may be other possibilities. It would not be surprising if perspective in dreaming were often indeterminate, multiple, or even absent (see Rosen & Sutton, 2013). For the sake of simplicity, such cases will not be considered here. Note, however, that, to the extent that we consider that memories have a single determinate perspective, these possibilities reinforce the point that successful dream remembering does not require authenticity.

²¹Observer perspective dreaming should be distinguished from what Rosen and Sutton (2013) refer to as “vicarious dreaming”, dreaming in which one experiences from the perspective of *another participant* in the dreamt event as opposed to a hypothetical observer of the event. For the sake of simplicity, vicarious dreaming will be set aside here, but it would appear to provide another illustration of the basic problem for the view that accuracy in dream memory is a matter of authenticity.

²²Additional discussion would be required to establish that the case in which we go from observer perspective to field perspective poses the same problems as the case in which we go from field perspective to observer perspective, for, while it is clear that content (specifically: content pertaining to the self's visual appearance) must be added in the latter case, it is less clear that content must be added in the former case. The case in which we go from field perspective to observer perspective, however, is sufficient for the argument.

remember the dream, and that the memory unfolds from an observer perspective. 408
 There is a clear sense in which the memory might be accurate and hence potentially 409
 successful. The conclusion to which we come is thus that accuracy in dream memory 410
 is not a matter of authenticity. If we grant that such dream memories can be 411
 accurate, then we stand in need of a notion of *a third kind of accuracy*, for they can- 412
 not, as we saw above, be true. 413

7.5 Beyond Truth and Authenticity: Accuracy as Faithfulness 414 as Faithfulness 415

If accuracy in dream memory is a matter neither of truth nor of authenticity, then of 416
 what *is* it a matter? In order to avoid having to answer this question, we might, in 417
 principle, abandon the assumption that dream memories can be accurate or inaccur- 418
 ate. The costs of making such a move are, however, too high for it to be appealing, 419
 as it would leave us unable to distinguish between cases in which memory gets 420
 things right with respect to a dream and cases in which it gets things wrong. 421
 Moreover, since there is no reason to suppose that, when it comes to potential (in) 422
 accuracy, dream memory is a special case, making this move would lead naturally 423
 to abandoning the assumption that memories of other sorts can be (in)accurate. And 424
 making *that* move would amount to abandoning the assumption that a memory 425
 must, in order to count as successful, satisfy an accuracy condition (such as causa- 426
 tion or reliability) in addition to a condition designed to rule out merely coincidental 427
 accuracy. The costs of making such a move are clearly too high for it to be accept- 428
 able, as it would leave us without any standard for success in remembering. 429
 Continuing, therefore, to assume that dream memory representations, like memory 430
 representations in general, can be (in)accurate, this section will argue that we need 431
 to distinguish a third kind of accuracy in remembering. 432

Accuracy is always accuracy *with respect to* something—in the first instance, 433
 with respect to the entity that the accurate representation is *about* or to which it 434
 refers. This goes for representations in general and hence for both memories and 435
 dreams. If we want to know what it is for a dream memory to be accurate, then, we 436
 would do well to start with the question of accuracy in dreaming and hence with the 437
 question of what dreams are about—that is, with the question of the *objects* of 438
 dreaming. Given that we are focussing on dreams about nonoccurrent events, this is 439
 a special case of the question of the objects of nonveridical experience. A traditional 440
 approach to that question is to introduce the notion of an *intentional object*, which 441
 can be defined, roughly, as an object of thought.²³ Consider, again, the case of non- 442
 veridical hallucinating. A nonveridical hallucination is not about the normative 443

²³There is a large and sophisticated literature on intentional objects; it will be impossible to take much of this literature into account here. Interestingly, the notion of an intentional object has rarely been employed in the philosophy of memory literature. There have been some discussions of the “intentional objects” of memory, but these are not about intentional objects in the relevant sense,

444 event (the event unfolding before the subject's eyes), but this does not prevent it
 445 from being about something. The event that it is about—despite the fact that that
 446 event does not actually occur—is its intentional object. Similarly, a dream about a
 447 nonoccurrent event is about something, and the event that it is about—despite the
 448 fact that it does not occur—it its intentional object.

449 The ontology of intentional objects is a notoriously tricky matter. If they are
 450 necessarily existent—in the case of events: occurrent²⁴—then they will not enable
 451 us to answer the question of what dreams are about. If they are potentially nonexistent
 452 or nonoccurrent, then they may enable us to answer that question, but their
 453 ontological status becomes murky. We might adopt the position that intentional
 454 objects, qua intentional objects, are “real”, where reality does not imply existence/
 455 occurrence, but doing so would require us to admit into our ontology entities that
 456 are in some sense real—that “partake of being”, to borrow a phrase from Plato—
 457 despite the fact that they do not exist/occur. Some theorists have nevertheless
 458 adopted this position, accepting the strange and arguably bloated ontology that it
 459 entails, but a more appealing position—and the one that will be adopted here—is
 460 provided by Crane's (2001) deflationary view. For Crane, an intentional object is
 461 simply an object of thought—what a thought is about. Intentional objects are not a
 462 kind of entity, and hence the question of their ontological status, qua intentional
 463 objects, does not arise. Some thoughts (for example, veridical perceptual experi-
 464 ences) have objects that exist/occur (the event unfolding before the subject's eyes);
 465 their intentional objects exist/occur in the ordinary way. Others (for example, non-
 466 veridical hallucination) do not; their intentional objects do not exist/occur at all.
 467 Indeed, in some cases, their intentional objects could not exist/occur: contrast my
 468 dream of giving the acceptance speech for the Nobel Prize for philosophy (a possi-
 469 ble but nonoccurrent event) with my dream of buying a car that is both red and green
 470 all over (an impossible and therefore nonoccurrent event).

471 The proposal, then, is that a dream, like a thought of any other sort, is about its
 472 intentional object and that the event that is its intentional object may be nonoccur-
 473 rent. A dream memory inherits its intentional object from the corresponding dream
 474 in the way in which memories in general inherit their intentional objects from the
 475 corresponding experiences. The dream memory may be accurate or inaccurate with
 476 respect to that object. The kind of accuracy in question—let us refer to it as “faith-
 477 fulness”—can be given a definition analogous to the definition of truth with which
 478 we started: a memory is faithful just in case it is accurate with respect to the inten-
 479 tional object of the subject's original experience.²⁵ The proposal, in short, is that

as the only alternatives considered (see, e.g., Fernández, 2017) are worldly (occurrent) events and mental events.

²⁴Existence and occurrence here are meant atemporally; in particular, an event is “occurrent” regardless of whether it occurs in the past, present, or future.

²⁵It is likely that not all experiences have intentional objects. (Consider phosphenes.) This does not, however, mean that faithfulness runs into the sort of difficulties into which we saw truth run in Sect. 7.3. In the case of an objectless experience, there is simply nothing, beyond the experience, with respect to which the accuracy of a later corresponding memory might be assessed. The mem-

accuracy in dream memory is a matter of faithfulness: memory for dreams aims neither at truth nor at authenticity but rather at faithfulness. Since there is no reason to suppose that, when it comes to potential (in)accuracy, dream memory is a special case, this implies that *memory, in general, aims neither at truth nor at authenticity but rather at faithfulness*.²⁶

Before going any further, let us pause to make the relationships among these three kinds of accuracy explicit. As far as the relationship between truth and authenticity is concerned, we have already seen that neither of these kinds of accuracy entails the other. Consider, then, the relationship between faithfulness and authenticity. We have already seen, in our discussion of observer perspective memories for field perspective dreams, that a memory can be faithful without being authentic. The converse would seem to be true as well: as long as an experience can be inaccurate with respect to its intentional object—and this is something that we need to grant into order to make sense of cases of misperceiving (for example, perceptual illusion) as well as analogous cases of misremembering (for example, the DRM effect)²⁷—a memory can be authentic without being faithful. Consider, next, the relationship between faithfulness and truth. On the one hand, faithfulness does not entail truth. Suppose that the subject nonveridically hallucinates. Then the intentional object of his experience is qualitatively distinct from the event unfolding before his eyes. A memory that is accurate with respect to the intentional object and is therefore faithful will thus be inaccurate with respect to the event that unfolded before his eyes and will therefore be untrue. On the other hand, truth does not entail faithfulness. Suppose, again, that the subject nonveridically hallucinates. A memory that is accurate with respect to the event that unfolded before his eyes and is therefore true will thus be inaccurate with respect to the intentional object and will therefore be unfaithful. In short, whereas there were, given the distinction between truth and authenticity, four possibilities to be taken into account when assessing the accuracy of a given memory—the memory might be true and authentic, true but not authentic, untrue but authentic, or untrue and inauthentic—there are now, in principle, eight possibilities to be taken into account.

Bearing this in mind, let us consider, again, the case of dream memory. We have been focussing on memories of dreams about nonoccurrent events, and we saw above that such memories are not truth-apt. This leaves us with the four possibilities illustrated in Fig. 7.1: the memory might be authentic or inauthentic, and, regardless of whether it is authentic or inauthentic, it might be faithful or unfaithful. In a case of divergence between the perspective adopted in the dream and that adopted in the memory of the kind discussed in Sect. 7.4, the memory will be inauthentic, but it

ory cannot be true, it cannot be faithful, but it can be authentic; authenticity thus provides the only available standard of accuracy.

²⁶This proposal may strike those who work on truth as trivial. The fact remains that it has not so far been discussed by those who work on memory.

²⁷On the DRM effect (in which subjects study a list of thematically-related words and later falsely recall having seen a thematically-consistent but nonstudied lure word) as a form of misremembering, see Robins, 2016.




Fig. 7.1 Memory for dreams

517 may nevertheless be faithful, which is, if the argument given above is right, all that
 518 is required for its being successful. Taking the accuracy of the dream itself into
 519 account complicates things somewhat. It is not the case that, if the dream was inac-
 520 curate, then a subsequent memory will necessarily be unfaithful if it is authentic, for
 521 authenticity is compatible with the subtraction of content, and it might be that the
 522 content in virtue of which the dream was inaccurate is not present in the memory.
 523 But, if the dream was accurate, then a subsequent memory will necessarily be faith-
 524 ful if it is authentic.

525 Admittedly, it is not immediately obvious that dreams about nonoccurrent events
 526 can be inaccurate with respect to their intentional objects; that is, it is not obvious
 527 that one can *misdream*, just as one can misperceive and misremember. Sense might
 528 be made of some cases of misdreaming by deploying the apparatus of possible
 529 worlds. When I dream of giving the acceptance speech for the Nobel Prize for phi-
 530 losophy, for example, my dream can be said to be accurate just in case it matches
 531 the relevant event in the nearest world in which I win the Nobel Prize for philoso-
 532 phy; if it does not match that event in that world, then I have misdreamt. Since the
 533 intentional objects of dreams include impossible events, however, this approach
 534 cannot be generalized to all cases of misdreaming. There is, for example, no possi-
 535 ble world in which I own a car that is both red and green all over. If we therefore opt
 536 to say that dreams about nonoccurrent events cannot be inaccurate with respect to
 537 their intentional objects, we are left with only three possibilities: if the memory is
 538 authentic, then it is necessarily faithful; if it is inauthentic, then it might be either
 539 faithful or unfaithful.

540 While it may not be clear whether dreams about nonoccurrent events can be inac-
 541 curate with respect to their intentional objects, it seems clear that dreams about
 542 occurrent events can be inaccurate with respect to their intentional objects—if one
 543 can dream about an occurrent event, one can misdream it. Broadening our focus to
 544 include cases in which the memory corresponds to a dream about an occurrent
 545 event, it might thus initially appear that we have the same range of possibilities as
 546 we do in cases in which the memory corresponds to a (nonhallucinatory) perceptual
 547 experience; see Fig. 7.2. The key point to note about perception memory is that




Fig. 7.2 Memory for perceptions

faithfulness and truth cannot come apart: since the intentional object (the object with respect to which faithfulness is assessed) just is the normative object (the object with respect to which truth is assessed), the memory will be true just in case it is faithful. Authenticity, however, can come apart from faithfulness and truth—cases of divergence between the perspective adopted in the perceptual experience and that adopted in the memory, again, serve to illustrate this possibility. We thus have four possibilities: the memory might be authentic or inauthentic, and, regardless of whether it is authentic or inauthentic, it might be faithful and true or unfaithful and untrue. Taking the accuracy of the experience itself into account, again, complicates things somewhat. It is not the case that, if the experience was inaccurate, then a subsequent memory will necessarily be unfaithful and untrue if it is authentic, for authenticity is compatible with the subtraction of content, and it might be that the content in virtue of which the experience was inaccurate is not present in the memory. But, if the experience was accurate, then a subsequent memory will necessarily be faithful and true if it is authentic.

Despite the initial appeal of the thought that we have the same range of possibilities in cases in which the memory corresponds to a dream about an occurrent event as we do in cases in which the memory corresponds to a (nonhallucinatory) perceptual experience, however, that thought is wrong, for, regardless of whether the dream was about an occurrent event or about a nonoccurrent event, dream memories are not truth-apt. Given the definition of truth adopted above, a memory is true just in case either the subject did not experience an event but the memory is accurate with respect to the normative event (the event that he should have experienced) or the subject did experience an event and the memory is accurate with respect to the event that he experienced. We saw above that there is no normative event in the case of dreams about nonoccurrent events, and the same thing goes for dreams about occurrent events: even if one dreams about an occurrent event, it is not the case that that is the event that one *should* dream about. The first disjunct is thus not satisfied. As far as the second disjunct is concerned, it might be tempting, if one is

577 comfortable with talk of remembering as reexperiencing, to think of dreaming about
 578 occurrent events as another form of reexperiencing. This assumes, however, that the
 579 occurrent events about which a given subject dreams are necessarily located in his
 580 past and have previously been experienced by him, and that assumption is clearly
 581 too strong. If I can dream about the talk I gave yesterday, I can surely dream about
 582 the talk I will give tomorrow, and, whatever merit talk of past-oriented dreaming as
 583 reexperiencing might have, talk of future-oriented dreaming as “preexperiencing” is
 584 clearly not to be taken seriously, just as talk of (waking) episodic future thought as
 585 preexperiencing is not to be taken seriously. Dreams, including dreams about occur-
 586 rent events, are not experiences of events. The second disjunct is thus not satisfied.
 587 We therefore have the same range of possibilities with respect to cases in which the
 588 memory corresponds to a dream about an occurrent event as we did with respect to
 589 cases in which the memory corresponds to a dream about a nonoccurrent event: the
 590 memory might be authentic and faithful, authentic and unfaithful, inauthentic and
 591 unfaithful, or inauthentic and faithful. The difference is that, given that dreams
 592 about occurrent events can be inaccurate with respect to their intentional objects, all
 593 four of these possibilities need to be taken into account, whereas the second argu-
 594 ably can be excluded in the case of dreams about nonoccurrent events.

595 Imagining was set aside above. We are now in a position to see that the situation
 596 with respect to imagining is analogous to the situation with respect to dreaming. In
 597 the case of imaginations about occurrent events (assuming that it is possible to
 598 imagine an occurrent event), the memory might be authentic and faithful, authentic
 599 and unfaithful, inauthentic and unfaithful, or inauthentic and faithful. In the case of
 600 imaginations about nonoccurrent events, the second of these possibilities can argu-
 601 ably be excluded.

602 Now that we have dealt with memory for dreams, perceptions, and imaginations,
 603 let us consider memory for hallucinations; see Fig. 7.3. Whereas truth and




Fig. 7.3 Memory for hallucinations

faithfulness cannot come apart in perception memory, they can come apart in hal- 604
 lucination memory. There are two cases to consider: memory for nonveridical hal- 605
 lucinations and memory for veridical hallucinations. In nonveridical hallucination 606
 memory, the normative object is qualitatively distinct from the intentional object. 607
 The memory thus cannot be accurate with respect to both the normative object and 608
 the intentional object: it is untrue if it is faithful, and it is unfaithful if it is untrue. 609
 The memory might, however, be *inaccurate* with respect to both the normative 610
 object and the intentional object—it might be both untrue and unfaithful. If we 611
 assume that the hallucinatory experience itself was accurate with respect to its 612
 intentional object, then, if the memory is authentic, it follows that it is faithful and 613
 hence untrue. If the memory is inauthentic, then it might, in principle, be untrue but 614
 faithful, faithful but untrue, or both untrue and unfaithful. 615

Matters are somewhat less straightforward when it comes to veridical hallucina- 616
 tion memory. Roughly speaking, a veridical hallucination is one in which the hal- 617
 lucinatory experience is accurate *with respect to* the event unfolding before the 618
 subject's eyes but is not *about* that event. In other words, a veridical hallucination is 619
 one in which the hallucinatory experience is accurate with respect to the normative 620
 event but in which the normative event is—because the experience is not appropri- 621
 ately linked to it—not the intentional object of the experience. If we assume that the 622
 experience is accurate with respect to its intentional object, then a veridical halluci- 623
 nation is one in which the normative event is not identical to the intentional object 624
 but in which the experience is accurate with respect to both the intentional object 625
 and the normative event. Given that the experience is accurate with respect to both 626
 the intentional object and the normative event, if a subsequent memory is authentic, 627
 then it will be both faithful and true. (If the memory is inauthentic, then it might be 628
 both faithful and true or both unfaithful and untrue.) There is, intuitively, a sense in 629
 which a veridical hallucination memory is defective even if it is authentic, faithful, 630
 and true. Such a memory need not violate a causal or reliability condition (see Sect. 631
 7.1 above) meant to rule out coincidental accuracy. This suggests that, to the extent 632
 that the memory is defective, its defectiveness is inherited from the corresponding 633
 hallucinatory experience. There are two options here. First, we might simply appeal 634
 to the fact that the hallucinatory experience was not appropriately linked to the nor- 635
 mative object. Second, we might appeal to the fact that, because it was not so linked, 636
 the intentional object of the experience was not identical to the normative event. The 637
 latter option seems preferable, as it enables us to say that there is something defec- 638
 tive about the memory itself: since the memory inherits its intentional object from 639
 the corresponding experience, the intentional object of the memory is not identical 640
 to the relevant normative event. This gives us a clear sense in which the memory is 641
 defective despite being authentic, faithful, and true.²⁸ 642

²⁸This way of putting the point seems to reify the intentional object, turning it into an entity in its own right. This would, of course, be inconsistent with the deflationary view of intentional objects adopted above. If Crane is right, it should be possible to restate the point in terms that do not suggest that the intentional object is an entity in its own right, but no attempt to do so will be made here.

643 **7.6 Conclusion: Authenticism, Alethism, and Pisticism**

644 The question with which we began was: what is it for an episodic dream memory to
 645 be accurate? The answer that has been defended here is that such a memory is *accurate*
 646 *just in case it is faithful*. Along the way, we have seen that there is reason to
 647 suppose that this goes not just for episodic dream memory but for episodic memory
 648 in general: an episodic memory, then, *whether of a dream or of an experience of*
 649 *another sort*, is accurate just in case it is faithful.

650 The motivation for asking what it is for an episodic memory to be *accurate*
 651 derives from a more general question: what is it for such a memory to be *successful*?
 652 As noted above, the current debate over successful memory has focussed almost
 653 entirely on causal and reliability conditions associated with the causal and simula-
 654 tion theories of memory; little has been said about the accuracy condition on suc-
 655 cessful remembering. Two positions on the nature of mnemonic accuracy have,
 656 however, been defended in the broader philosophy of memory literature. On the one
 657 hand, authors including Bernecker (2010) and McCarroll (2018) have defended
 658 *authenticism*, according to which successful remembering requires both truth and
 659 authenticity. On the other hand, Michaelian and Sant’Anna (2022) have defended
 660 *alethism*, according to which successful remembering requires truth but not authen-
 661 ticity. The conclusion to which we have come here suggests a third view, *pisticism*
 662 (from “pistis”, the Greek for faith)²⁹: successful remembering requires faithfulness
 663 but not authenticity or truth.

664 The adoption of pisticism may have consequences for the various causalist and
 665 simulationist arguments that have been offered in the successful memory debate. It
 666 may also have consequences for the causal and simulation theories themselves.
 667 Michaelian’s (2016b) argument for simulationism, for instance, as well as his recent
 668 argument for a virtue-theoretic variant of the simulation theory (Michaelian, 2021),
 669 presuppose alethism. We might thus wonder whether those arguments can still be
 670 run if alethism is replaced with pisticism. Since, in the core case of perception
 671 memory, truth and faithfulness cannot come apart, it is likely that they can be. But a
 672 detailed discussion of this question (and of the analogous question about Bernecker’s,
 673 2010 arguments for causalism, which presuppose authenticism) will have to be left
 674 for a future occasion. The question what pisticism implies concerning memory for
 675 forms of experience other than perceptual experience, imagination, and hallucina-
 676 tion—we might, for example, want to consider forms of experience including mind-
 677 wandering and remembering itself—will likewise have to be left for a future
 678 occasion.

²⁹It would perhaps be more elegant to opt for a Latin root, which would give us “fideism”, but that term is already taken.

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